Framing Political Change: Can a Left Populism Disrupt the

Rise of the Reactionary Right?

Comment on “Politics, Power, Poverty and Global Health: Systems and Frames” by Labonté, Ronald
Framing Political Change: Can a Left Populism Disrupt the 
Rise of the Reactionary Right?
Comment on “Politics, Power, Poverty and Global Health: Systems and Frames”
Ronald Labonté*
Abstract
Solomon Benatar offers an important critique of the limited frame that sets the boundaries of much of what is 
referred to as ‘global health.’ In placing his comments within a criticism of increasing poverty (or certainly income 
and wealth inequalities) and the decline in our environmental commons, he locates our health inequities within 
the pathology of our present global economy. In that respect it is a companion piece to an editorial I published 
around the same time. Both Benatar’s and my paralleling arguments take on a new urgency in the wake of the US 
presidential election. Although not a uniquely American event (the xenophobic right has been making inroads in 
many parts of the world), the degree of vitriol expressed by the President-elect of the world’s (still) most powerful 
and militarized country is being used to further legitimate the policies of right-extremist parties in Europe while 
providing additional justification for the increasingly autocratic politics of leaders (elected or otherwise) in many 
other of the world’s nations. To challenge right-populism’s rejection of the predatory inequalities that 4 years of 
(neo)-liberal globalization have created demands strong and sustained left populism built, in part, on the ecocentric 
frame advocated by Benatar. 
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Somewhat coincidentally, or at least curiously, two people from opposite sides of the world wrote very similar published in this journal scarcely three weeks apart. 
The two articles do take different trajectories. One, which I 
wrote,1 focused on health promotion, neoliberalism and the 
Sustainable Development Goals; while the other, by Solomon 
Benatar,2 discussed power, global health, policy/political 
framing and the environmental crises we now face. But 
their respective analyses of where health and broader social 
inequities are located – in a pathological global economy 
and a supporting hegemonic discourse, defined by me as 
neoliberal capitalism and by Benatar as individualism and 
market fundamentalism – are essentially the same. 
Benatar’s argument hinged more on an important critique 
of the limited frame surrounding our recently pumped up 
interests in ‘global health.’ He argues that global health is not 
the same as international health, although his characterization 
of international health as an extension of a ‘charitable…
ideologically inspired, individualistic, and biomedical 
conception’ may be a bit too harsh. There is also a history of 
a politically critical ‘new internationalism’ that arose around 
the same time that the post-colonizing ‘developing’ world was 
pushing for a ‘new international economic order,’ using the 
bipolar cold war as a leveraging point. While much of what 
is described as global health today still tends to distil to the 
patronizing international health Benatar critiques, there have 
been strong calls to shift such developed/developing (or high-
income/low-income) country collaborations into a more 
critical orientation that interrogates and proposes actions to 
remediate the inherently global causes and consequences of 
the high disease burden in poorer countries. 
Thus, the West African Ebola outbreak in 2014 was not 
simply a failure of global health’s limited moral framing, as 
Benatar posits. Its roots also lay in civil conflicts fueled by rich 
world exploitation of the countries’ mineral resources; the 
land-grabbing destruction of its tropical forests that brought 
fruit bat populations into close human contact3; earlier and 
still current structural adjustment loan conditionalities 
of the international financial institutions (IFIs) based on 
neoliberal orthodoxy that weakened public infrastructures 
(including health systems) and fueled the ‘brain drain’ of 
already undersupplied health workers to wealthier countries4; 
and years of IFI advice to keep taxes low to attract foreign 
investment. The result: Sierra Leone, in the two years 
preceding the Ebola outbreak, gave transnational companies 
tax holidays worth roughly ten times what it spent annually 
on its public health programs.5 We know the inherently global 
causes (and consequences) of our health inequitable planet.
In arguing for a reconceptualization of what we mean by 
global health, Benatar usefully describes how our belief 
systems, frames, cognitive biases and metaphors inform 
our global health actions. This is particularly urgent given 
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the environmental crises we are now experiencing (his own 
near-definition of global health is as an ‘ecocentric concept’), 
and which can no longer be managed through policies or 
programs embedded in the underlying economic and political 
forces (and their implicit or explicit values) that construct the 
delimiting frames within which our global health responses 
are crafted. He is not alone in taking aim at the Lancet-
University of Oslo Commission on global governance for 
health for its deft diagnoses of our global ills, but exceedingly 
weak recommendations bound within the norms of existing 
systems of power and privilege. However, he may be mistaken 
in attributing this weakness to a ‘lack of moral imagination’ 
(since the many of the members of the Commission, in my 
experience of them, have quite vivid moral imaginings), rather 
than to the very criticism he levels at the Commission: that it 
exists within hierarchies of power and privilege which make it 
intrinsically difficult for it to confront those systems of power 
explicitly in the solutions it proposes. This was also somewhat 
the case with the World Health Organization’s Commission 
on Social Determinants of Health,7 which was critically 
strong in its problem analyses but substantially tamer in its 
recommendations (although these were still punchier than 
those of the Lancet-Oslo Commission). 
Where Benatar and I return to convivial company (and 
one which I believe most members of the Lancet-Oslo 
Commission would enjoy) is his conclusion that global 
health is unlikely to improve without ‘some changes in how 
the global political economy operates’ (although I would say, 
more than just some changes). I ended my three-week earlier 
piece in a similar vein, questioning whether we could reform 
our current and predatory neoliberal capitalism into a gentler, 
fairer and more sustainable version; or, if not, what visionary 
system (built, in part, on the ideals implicit in most but not all 
of the Sustainable Development Goals) might achieve massive 
popular consensus. What both articles leave only vaguely 
sketched is how the structures of elite power and privilege 
might be transformed to diffuse a new moral imaginary 
(Benatar) or a new global economy (me).
The urgency of such a task is greater now than just a few 
days ago. I write this commentary just four days after the 
world’s (still) largest and most militarized economy elected 
for President a self-proclaiming misogynist, racist, climate-
change denying, tax-avoiding (if not evading), narcissistic 
member of the elite 1% whose wealth derives from exploitative 
domestic and international business ventures. As pundit 
analysts have pointed out since, the surprise win for Donald 
Trump was, at base, the failure of our past 40 years of neoliberal 
globalization to benefit the majority of people living in high-
income countries, and not just those in the United States. 
Trump is a curious hybrid: an elite anti-elite heaping scorn 
on the institutions of the liberal bourgeoisie at home and 
abroad, while using a xenophobic romanticism for a world 
that never was and a divisive politics of fear and hate that 
embodies the essence of right-wing populism. There remains 
little doubt, given similar dynamics playing out in much of 
Europe, that liberal globalization’s repeated promise that its 
open markets, hypermobile capital and labour flexibilization 
will, given enough time, trickle down to benefit all. For most 
in the older industrialized economies, it has not. For those 
in the newer industrialized economies who have benefited 
through outsourced manufacturing, it has come with the 
social cost of the same upsurge in wealth inequalities that the 
older, established powers have experienced. For several years 
the world’s multilateral organizations (even the World Bank 
and IMF) have cautioned that the lack of equitable sharing 
in the economic wealth created over the past 40 years would 
lead to social chaos. This is beginning to happen, and is 
likely to worsen unless the bases of right-wing populism are 
challenged, and not just in facts, but in acts. Whether the post-
Trump election protests become a sustained change force in 
the United States remains to be seen; but such protests over 
a presidential election result (targeting the hate-mongering 
statements expressed by the candidate during the campaign) 
may be an American first, at least within living memory. 
One wonders what might have transpired in the United States 
had Bernie Sanders and his middling-left populism become 
the Democratic candidate. Sanders tapped into the same 
disenfranchisement experienced by blue collar and largely 
white men as Trump, and railed equally strongly against 
the same elites; but he did so from a moderately socialist 
(more accurately, neo-Keynesian), inclusive and non-divisive 
platform. European centre-left parties, even when they 
succeed in gaining power as they have in Greece, have a poor 
record of being transformative, and without a Sanders-led 
change in the US Congress and Senate there would have been 
little chance of his presidency making much of a difference. 
But at least the analysis and orientation of the electoral 
protests against the 40 year rule of the 1% might have gone 
in a different and potentially transformative (rather than 
reactionary) direction. 
And so the critical global health questions for our new era: 
If there is no longer much popular support across many of 
the world’s nations for the liberalized globalization that has 
impoverished and diminished the lives of many, is there a 
left-populism that could yet avoid the environmental and 
social cataclysms into which we are now rushing headlong? 
And, as both Benatar and I hint at, are there sufficiently 
strong and organized civil society movements at national 
and global scales to advance a more socialist and ecocentric 
vision as effectively as our new cohort of right-wing populist 
demagogues have done with theirs? 
Let us hope there is, and work to make it so; for we now 
face a political and economic climate similar to that which 
fed World War One, and then World War Two. History may 
not repeat itself (it cannot), but certain historical patterns 
can resurrect under similar conditions. We cannot let neo-
fascistic right-wing populism (once again) claim the political 
space of social protest.
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